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ABSTRACT
In this paper we analyze and interpret the quote price dynamics of 100 NYSE stocks
with varying average trade frequencies. We specify an error-correction model for the log
difference of the bid and the ask price, with the spread acting as the error-correction
term, and include as regressors the characteristics of the trades occurring between quote
observations, if any. We find that short duration and medium volume trades have the
largest impacts on quote prices for all one hundred stocks, and that buyer initiated
trades primarily move the ask price while seller initiated trades primarily move the bid
price. Trades have a greater impact on quotes in both the short and the long run for the
infrequently traded stocks than for the more actively traded stocks. Finally, we find
strong evidence that the spread is mean reverting.
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21. INTRODUCTION
We propose an error-correction model for the bid and the ask prices, with the spread
acting as the error-correction term. We use eighteen months of data on a selection of one
hundred stocks from a range of trade frequency deciles to determine whether systematic
differences in quote price behavior exist between deciles. One would not expect that a
stock that averages just a few trades per day should exhibit the same dynamics as one,
which averages hundreds or thousands of trades per day1.
Modeling the bid and ask prices in a vector autoregressive system enables us to analyze
any asymmetries in the impacts of trades on the bid or the ask price. For example, as
market participants wishing to purchase a stock must do so at the ask price, we would
expect that the impact of a buy is greater on the ask price than on the bid price. The
converse should be true for a trade designated as a sell. Further, we are able to extract
the implied models for the spread and the mid-quote from the model for the bid and ask
prices, and analyze the impacts of various trade characteristics on these variables as
well. We use the spread – mid-quote model to analyze the long run impacts of different
types of trades.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides an overview
of the literature relevant to this study. In Section 3 we describe the trade and quote data
used, and the methods employed in preparing it for analysis.  Section 4 presents the
model and the variables contained therein. Section 5 outlines some of the testable
3economic hypotheses relevant to this paper, and Section 6 relates the empirical results to
these hypotheses. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.
2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
The ever-increasing availability of microstructure data and the computational
technology necessary for its analysis mean that the empirical market microstructure
literature is a fast growing one. This paper draws on and extends ideas presented in
three previous studies: Jang and Venkatesh (1991), Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman
(1996) and Huang and Stoll (1994)
Huang and Stoll (1994) use an econometric specification that contains the quote revision
and the transaction returns in a bivariate simultaneous equations system. They estimate
their model via the generalised method of moments, using all transaction data during
the calendar year 1988 on twenty of the most frequently traded stocks. Evidence that the
amount of information present in a trade varies positively according to the size of the
trade is found, and also that lagged returns on the S&P500 futures contract is a good
predictor of both quote revisions and stock returns. In addition, they find that the depth
at the ask price in excess of that at the bid price enters negatively into their model for the
mid-quote, indicating that the asymmetric information effect dominates the inventory
effect of depths.
                                                                                                                                                
1 The average number of trades per day in our sample ranges from 5.03 for International
Aluminum Corp to 450.35 for Donaldson Luf Jenrette Inc.
4Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996) examine empirically the difference in
probabilities of informed trading between less frequently traded stocks and frequently
traded stocks. The authors used trade volume to sort the stocks into deciles, and based
their sample on a random selection from the 10th, 6th and 3rd deciles (where the 10th decile
contains the stocks with the highest trade volume, and the 1st decile contains the lowest
trade volume stocks).2 A theoretical model for the market maker’s price-setting decision
problem is specified as a Bayesian learning model, the parameters of which are then
estimated from the data. They find that the risk of trading with an informed agent is
lower for the more actively traded stocks, implying that larger spreads for less
frequently traded stocks are to be expected.
Jang and Venkatesh (1991) use descriptive statistics to draw inferences about quote price
behavior. The authors use quote and trade data on all stocks listed on the NYSE, for the
period March 1985 to April 1985 to analyze the changes in the posted bid and ask prices
in the context of the various market microstructure theories. Amongst other results, they
report that over three-quarters of the quote changes in their data set are inconsistent
with the predictions of the models of the specialist, which state that following a trade at
the bid (ask) both quote prices should be revised down (up) by the same amount. The
asymmetry in impact of a transaction at the bid versus that at the ask for each of the
quote prices is one of the subjects under analysis in our paper. Jang and Venkatesh also
report that quote price behavior is different for times with a large spread from those
                                                
2 In this paper we used the total number of trades, rather than the total number of shares traded,
to sort the stocks into trade frequency deciles. While the two measures are probably highly
correlated, they are not identical.
5with a small spread. Specifically, the spread is much more likely to decrease than
increase at the following observation if it is greater than three-eighths, with the converse
being true if the spread is at or below two-eighths. This is another feature we attempt to
capture in our model.
3.  THE DATA
The data used in this paper were taken from the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) dataset,
produced by the New York Stock Exchange. This dataset contains every trade and quote
posted on the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ National Market
System for all securities listed on the NYSE. Further information about this dataset can
be found in NYSE Inc (1999).
In order to obtain a sample of stocks with a range of trade frequencies, we first used data
on the total number of trades in the 1997 calendar year on all NYSE listed stocks to
determine trade frequency deciles. The average number of trades ranged from 1,090 for
Decile 1 to 174,825 for Decile 10. We then randomly selected 25 stocks from each of the
second, fourth, sixth and eighth deciles, checking that each stock traded continuously for
the entire sample period, and excluding American Depositary Receipts and Real Estate
Investment Trusts. The 100 stocks selected via this procedure became the sample for this
study. Table A.1 in the Appendix contains a list of the stocks selected, and Table 3.1
presents some summary statistics of the data over the sample period.
6One of the main attractions of market microstructure data is also one of its main
drawbacks: it is very detailed. This detail allows us to closely examine the behavior of
stock prices, but also requires us to carefully prepare the data for analysis. Such things
as stock splits and dividends must be accounted for, as well as exchange enforced trade
halts and the like. We deal with the above situations by removing any trades that occur
immediately after the payment of a dividend, or the resumption of trade after a trade
halt of some kind. In the case of the former, we do so to remove the impact of the drop
in price that occurs following the payment of a dividend, which is essentially a
deterministic part of the price dynamics. In the case of the latter, we do so to reflect the
fact that the first price after such a halt is probably not generated by the same dynamics
as the other prices. As a filter for recording or transcription errors, we exclude any
observations that represent a change of more than 50% from the previous observation, if
followed by another change of a similar magnitude in the opposite direction.
3.1. Trade Data
Although we do not actually model transaction prices in this paper, we do use the
characteristics of transactions in our model of quote prices. As such it was necessary to
prepare the trade data set as though it were to be modelled.
We first removed any trades that occurred with non-standard correction or G127 codes
(both of these are fields in the trades data base on the TAQ CDs), such as trades that
were cancelled, trades that were recorded out of time sequence, and trades that called
for the delivery of the stock at some later date. We then cumulated any trades that were
7recorded with the same time stamp into one trade3. To do this we summed the total
volume of the trades, attributed it to the first trade, and then removed the other trades
from the sample.
Any trades that were recorded to have occurred before 9:30am (the official start of
trading on the NYSE) or after 4pm (the official close of trading) were removed. Trade
durations were calculated as the difference in seconds between two successive trade
time stamps, except for the overnight period. For the overnight period, we calculated the
duration as the time between the last trade of the previous day and 4pm plus the time
between 9:30am and the time of the first trade on the next day, thus ignoring the entire
overnight (and weekend) period.
We constructed BUY and SELL indicator variables for the trades according to a
procedure proposed and tested by Lee and Ready (1991) that is now common in the
empirical market microstructure literature, see Hasbrouck (1991) and Easley et al. (1996).
This procedure identifies the standing quote at a given trade, calculates the mid-quote,
and compares the price at which the trade occurred with the mid-quote. If the trade
price was higher than the mid-quote, the trade is considered “buyer-initiated”. If the
trade price was lower than the mid-quote then it is considered “seller-initiated”. If the
trade price was exactly at the mid-quote, then we consider it to be indeterminate. We
also consider all trades that occur before the first quote of the day to be indeterminate.
                                                
3 Simultaneous trading of a stock on two or more exchanges is possible. Such trades are
guaranteed to execute at the same price, as all trades must take place at the national best bid or
offer price.
8Due to problems in the trade and quote recording process, Lee and Ready suggest that
using quotes that are at least five seconds old as the standing quote for a trade is
preferable to using quotes immediately prior to a trade.
3.2. Quote Data
We use only quotes that were posted at the NYSE in this study, rather than all quotes
posted at all exchanges. Blume and Goldstein (1997) used one year of data from the TAQ
CDs (from July 1994 to June 1995) on all U.S. domiciled companies that reported at least
one trade in the twelve month period; a total of 2023 stocks. They find that the NYSE
quote, on average, determines or matches the national best quote around 95% of the
time, compared with the next best exchange (the Cincinnati exchange) with 11 to 12%.
As all trades on any exchange must be executed at the national best quote, those quotes
that are not at the national best are not relevant to traders.
In a similar fashion to the formatting of the trade data, we removed any observations
that appeared with non-standard quote modes (a field in the TAQ quote data base) or
that were recorded as occurring before 9:30am or after 4pm.
A common feature of microstructure data is the high ratio of the number of quotes in a
period to the number of trades. A large proportion of these additional quotes are
adjustments to the quote depths at a particular price, and not changes in actual quote
prices, see Table 3.1 for the proportions of quotes with no price changes. In the present
study, we are primarily focused on quote price dynamics, and as such, we discard any
quotes that do not reflect a change in either the bid or the ask price.
94. THE MODEL
One of the unique features of this study is that it models the bid and ask prices as a
system, rather than just the mid-quote as is done is some previous studies, see Dufour
and Engle (2000) and Hasbrouck (1991). By modeling the two quote prices explicitly we
are able to obtain models for the mid-quote and the spread, and are also able to capture
any asymmetries in the dynamics of the two series.
Below we present the model used in the analysis of the bid and ask prices. As expected,
the log levels of the bid and ask prices were found to be integrated of order one in most
cases4, and so the models are specified in terms of log-differences. We estimate the
models on the bid and ask series as tenth order vector autoregression, as below.  The
variables in the model are described in Table 4.1.
Quote observations are indexed t = 1, 2, …, T, while trades are indexed according to the
quote they precede: t(t)-j indexes the jth most recent trade to quote observation t. As the
equation below indicates, we include information on the five most recent trades as
exogenous regressors in our model. k(t) is a function that counts the number of trades
occurring between quote t-1 and quote t. The bottom two rows of Table 3.1 show the
median and mean of k(t) for the four deciles.
                                                
4 We used an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to determine whether we could reject the null
hypothesis of a unit root in the log level of the quote prices, using 10 lags of the change in the
variable to remove any serial correlation. For 92 bid series and 91 ask series we could not reject



























































































































































































                     
















The equation above was estimated using ordinary least squares. We anticipated the
presence of heteroscedasticity in the residuals and so estimated the standard errors of
the estimators in each equation using White’s (1980) method. This method provides
standard errors that are robust to a wide variety of forms of heteroscedasticity. We also
used White’s method to estimate the covariance between the estimators in the ask price
equation and the estimators in the bid price equation. Having obtained this we are able
to derive the coefficient estimates and standard errors of the implied model for the
spread and mid-quote by applying the appropriate rotation.
                                                                                                                                                
expected rejection rate found may reflect a change in the power of the ADF test in the face of the
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5. SOME TESTABLE ECONOMIC HYPOTHESES
5.1. Evidence of error-correction behavior
We include as a regressor in the vector autoregression the lagged log spread, defined as
the difference between the log ask price and the log bid price, which would behave as
the error-correction term if the two series were cointegrated. That is, we would expect
large spread at the previous quote to lead to a rise in the bid price and a fall in the ask
price at the following quote, to restore the spread to its long-run equilibrium value.
Similarly, a small spread should do the opposite. Augmented Dickey Fuller tests on the
log spread, including 10 lags of the change in the spread to account for serial correlation,
indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis that the spread is I(1) for all 100 stocks, at
the 1% alpha level. This fact, combined with the fact that the bid and ask series are
integrated, suggests that the quote price series are cointegrated.
Easley and O’Hara (1992) suggest something similar to this, in their second proposition.
They assert that the bid and ask price will converge toward the equilibrium stock price
in periods with no trades, which implies that the equilibrium spread in the absence of
trades is zero. Jang and Venkatesh (1991) also allude to error-correcting behavior, when
they write that a decrease in the spread is more likely than an increase when the spread
is greater than some threshold (three-eighths of a dollar), and more likely to increase
when it is below some threshold (one-quarter of a dollar).
                                                                                                                                                
discrete dependent variable.
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5.2. Asymmetric impact of BUYs and SELLs
Economic theory suggests that a BUY should have a positive impact on both the bid and
the ask prices, while a SELL should have a negative impact. It does not suggest,
however, that the impacts of BUYs and SELLs need be the same. When a market
participant wishes to take a long position in a stock, he/she must purchase that stock
from the market maker, at the posted ask price. Conversely, if the trader wishes to
reduce a long position or go short, he/she must trade at the bid price. Thus it would
seem logical that a BUY has a larger impact on the ask price than a SELL, and that a
SELL has a larger impact on the bid price than a BUY. The above logic suggests that the
ask price leads the bid price when the stock price is rising, while the bid price leads the
ask price when the stock price is falling.
5.3. Does size matter?
Does the size of the trade affect the impact it has on the quote prices? In order to answer
this question we introduce two indicator variables designed to reflect the size of the
trade. The Vmed variable is one if the trade volume was between 1,000 and 10,000 shares
and zero otherwise, while the Vbig variable is one if the trade volume is greater than
10,000 shares and zero otherwise. The literature is not unanimous on the effect of trade
size on price impacts.  Hasbrouck (1991) finds that larger trade volumes increase the
spread more than smaller volumes, while Barclay and Warner (1993) and Keim and
Madhavan (1996) suggest that a quadratic relation may be more appropriate. Barclay
and Warner (1993) find that medium volume trades (defined as those with volume
between 500 and 9900 shares; very similar to our definition) drive most of the
cumulative stock price movements, and suggest that informed traders break up their
13
trades so as to remain less conspicuous. Keim and Madhavan provide evidence of
information leakage as block trades are ‘shopped’ in the upstairs market. The
“downstairs” market is the regular stock market, where trades are accomplished via
buying or selling through the market maker. The upstairs market, on the other hand, is a
market for very high volume trades (minimum 10,000 shares) where the transaction is
carried out by a broker or intermediary, who locates (potentially many) counter-parties
to the trade. Information leakage occurs when the price of the stock rises or falls prior to
the execution of the block trade as the broker “shops” the block trade, thus revealing
some of the information the block trade carries before it is actually executed.
5.4. What kind of news is no news?
In addition to considering the volume of a trade, we also examine the impact of the
duration of a trade, defined as the time between two trades. Theoretical studies by
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and Easley and O’Hara (1992) suggest that the time
between trades conveys information about the type of news a trade carries. Diamond
and Verrecchia suggest that long times between trades reflect bad news, as short selling
restrictions prevent traders from selling a stock on the basis of bad news. Easley and
O’Hara, on the other hand, propose that long durations signal neither bad nor good
news. Empirical studies by Dufour and Engle (2000) and Engle (2000) have found
evidence to support the Easley and O’Hara hypothesis that long durations imply no
news. We include a short duration indicator variable for durations of less than 60
seconds and a long duration indicator for durations longer than 5 minutes to capture the
effects documented in the above studies.
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5.5. Inventory balance vs. Asymmetric information effects
In our model above we include a variable first suggested by Huang and Stoll (1994) to
determine which of the inventory balance and asymmetric information effects is the
strongest. This variable is the difference between the log of the quote depth at the ask
price and the log of the quote depth at the bid price. The inventory effect asserts that a
market maker with excess inventory will simultaneously lower the ask price and raise
the ask depth, in order to attract buyers. At the next quote the ask price is raised back to
its previous level. A similar argument for the bid price holds in the case when the
market maker has too small an inventory. Thus the inventory effect suggests that the
coefficient on the difference between the ask depth and the bid depth will be positive:
excess depth at the ask will lead to a rise in the ask price, while excess depth at the bid
will lead to a fall.
The asymmetric information effect, on the other hand, asserts that the impact on quote
prices of an excess of supply at the ask over that at the bid is negative. High depth at the
ask price potentially indicates a number of sellers on the limit order book, suggesting to
the market that the stock is overpriced. Huang and Stoll also note that the presence of
the barrier effect would have the same impact as that of the asymmetric information
effect5. Higher depth at the ask price than at the bid price means less trade volume is
required before a downward movement than an upward movement. Thus the barrier to
a downward movement is weaker than that to an upward movement, making a
                                                
5 See O’Hara (1995) for more detail on these three market microstructure theories.
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downward movement more likely. The same logic applies when the depth at the bid
price is greater than that at the ask price.
5.6. Deterministic Time-of-Day Effects
In a manner similar to seasonality in macroeconomic variables, intra-daily data may
exhibit “intra-daily seasonality”, which is more accurately called diurnality. In an effort
to capture any deterministic component of the intra-day dynamics of the variables under
analysis, we use piece-wise linear splines to reflect the time of trade day that the
observation appeared. Previous studies, see Engle and Russell (1998) and Dufour and
Engle (2000), have also used a similar method of diurnal adjustment. The nodes of the
splines are the start of the trade day, 9:30am, and then 10am, 11am, noon, 1pm, 2pm,
3pm, 3:30pm and the close of the trade day, 4pm.
Chen, Chung and Johnson (1995) report that the spread on frequently traded NYSE
stocks display a U-shape, that is, that spreads are larger at the beginning and end of the
trade day than they are in the middle. We can determine whether this holds when
controlling for the regressors described in Table 4.1, and also look for any systematic
patterns that emerge between stocks with different average trade frequencies. The
significance of the diurnal variables in our model will indicate whether time-of-day
effects are important for quote price revisions.
6. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS FOR QUOTE PRICE DYNAMICS
The model presented in the above equation was estimated on all 100 stocks. For ease of
exposition, we selected one stock from each decile for presentation as a representative of
16
the entire decile. A summary of the results of the econometric estimation on the quote
price series for the four representative stocks is presented in Table 6.1. This table
contains only the variables of economic interest to us. The complete set of results for
these stocks is presented in the Appendix, in Table A.2. The results for a particular
variable for the entire sample of stocks are presented in the form of the median
coefficient for each decile, along with a count of the number of times the coefficient was
positive and significant, and negative and significant. This format enables us to draw
general conclusions as the significance and magnitude of coefficients across deciles.
6.1. Specification Tests
The summary statistics presented at the bottom on Table 6.1 indicate that the regressions
are very significant, with all F-statistics (testing for the joint significance of the variables
in the model) being large. The R2 statistics for the representative stocks range from 0.248
to 0.337, all quite high. We tested for two forms of misspecification: serial correlation
and heteroscedasticity.
A common test for serial correlation is the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (or LM)
test, which involves regressing the residuals on lags of themselves, and on the regressors
in the model. Due to the large number of regressors in our model, we found that this
was computationally infeasible for the most frequently traded stocks. We instead look at
Ljung-Box’s (1978) statistic for the residuals, which is asymptotically equivalent to the
LM test, but involves only the finding of the autocorrelation function of the residuals.
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For all but one stock, we find no evidence of serial correlation in the residuals at the 1%
alpha level, using ten lags. This indicates that the inclusion of ten lags of the dependent
variables and five lags of the trade indicator variables was sufficient to capture the
commonly observed negative serial correlation in microstructure data.
Although we needed five lags of the trade indicator variables in the model to remove the
presence of serial correlation6, we found that very few of the second or further lags of
the trade variables were significant. This implies that although the second through fifth
lags of the trade variables are jointly significant, they are not usually individually
significant. To conserve space, and simplify the presentation of the results, we present
only the coefficients on the most recent trade indicator. The complete set of results for
the representative stocks is presented in Table A.2, and the results for the entire sample
of stocks may be obtained from the authors on request.
The time varying volatility of financial time series has been widely documented, see
Black (1976), Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992) and Schwert (1989) for examples, and
so we should expect that the data used in this paper also exhibit this characteristic. We
again use the Ljung-Box statistic to test for heteroscedasticity, this time on the squared
residuals. Using ten lags of the squared residuals and an alpha level of 1%, we find
evidence of heteroscedasticity in 192 of the 200 series. This means that the usual
                                                
6 We previously estimated the same model with only one lag of the trade indicator variables, and
found substantial evidence of serial correlation. Stoll (2000) also finds substantial evidence of
negative serial correlation in quote price changes.
18
standard errors of the estimators are inconsistent for the true standard errors, and so the
use of White’s robust standard errors is necessary.
In the subsections below we relate the results obtained to the economic hypotheses
discussed in section 5.
6.2. Error-correction behavior
In all eight of the series’ results presented in Table 6.1 we find that the coefficient on the
lagged spread is significant, and of the correct sign. As hypothesized, a high spread
leads to a decrease in the ask price and an increase in the bid price, moving the spread
toward its equilibrium value. This result complements the descriptive results presented
in Jang and Venkatesh (1991), and supports Easley and O’Hara’s (1992) proposition.
In the entire sample of 100 stocks (and thus 200 quote price series) we find that that the
coefficient on the spread is significant and of the correct sign 187 times. This is very
strong support for the importance of this variable in describing quote price dynamics.
Table 6.2: Coefficients on the SPRt-1 Variable.
Decile 2 Decile 4 Decile 6 Decile 8
Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid
Median -.1333 0.1220 -0.1342 0.1640 -0.1446 0.1444 -0.1569 0.1359
Signif pos 0 22 0 23 0 25 0 25
Signif neg 19 0 23 0 25 0 25 0
NOTE: Signif pos  and Signif neg count the number of times this variable was significant at the 1% level, and
of the indicated sign. The maximum possible is 25.
The magnitudes of the coefficients are approximately the same across stocks and deciles,
as can be seen in Table 6.2 above. The similar magnitudes of these coefficients across the
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deciles indicate that the speed (in event time) of adjustment of quote prices from a large
or small spread is not affected by average trade frequency. However, as fewer events
happen per day for the lower deciles, the calendar time taken for the quotes to adjust is
greater for infrequently traded stocks than frequently traded stocks.
6.3. Asymmetric Impacts of BUYs and SELLs
From the results for the representative stocks in Table 6.1 we observe that both the BUY
variables and the SELL variables all have the a priori expected signs: the BUY variables
all have positive signs, indicating that a buyer-initiated trade raises the price, while a
seller-initiated trade lowers the price. Further, we can see that the coefficients on the
BUY variables are more significant and greater in magnitude that the SELL variables in
the models for the ask price. The reverse is true for the models for the bid price. Table
6.3 shows that this holds for the entire sample.
Table 6.3: Coefficients on the BUYt (t)-1 and SELLt (t)-1 Variables.
ASK BIDBUYt Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8 Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8
Median 0.2146 0.1179 0.0904 0.0624 0.1192 0.0637 0.0431 0.0290
Signif pos 21 24 25 25 18 22 24 25
Signif neg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ASK BIDSELLt (t)-1 Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8 Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8
Median -0.0844 -0.0504 -0.0399 -0.0297 -0.1822 -0.0940 -0.0743 -0.0525
Signif pos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Signif neg 18 22 24 25 17 24 25 25
NOTE: Signif pos  and Signif neg count the number of times this variable was significant at the 1% level, and
of the indicated sign. The maximum possible is 25.
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The results for the BUYt (t)-1 and SELLt (t)-1 variables extend to the other signed trade
indicator variables in the results for the representative stocks, with a couple of
exceptions (the large volume sell variable is significant in the Decile 2 stock’s ask price
model, and the long duration sell variable is significant in the Decile 8 stock’s ask price
model). For the entire sample we find that the BUY variables are more often significant
in the ask price model than SELL variables, with the opposite holding true in the model
for the bid price, sound evidence in support of the assertion that a buyer-initiated trade
has a greater influence on the ask price than a seller-initiated trade, which is what
economic intuition suggests should happen. This asymmetry in the impacts of BUYs and
SELLs on the ask and bid prices would not have been as easily detectable in a model for
the spread and mid-quote.
In presenting the results for the remaining coefficients, we will present only those
multiplied by a BUY in the ask price model, and only those multiplied by a SELL in the
bid price model, in the interests of parsimony.
6.4. Does trade size matter?
Yes, but only up to a point. In all four representative stocks we find that the coefficient
on the Vmed variable is significant, when multiplied by the appropriate trade indicator
variable. This indicates that a trade with volume between 1,000 shares and 10,000 shares
carries more quote price relevant information than a trade of less than 1,000 shares. This
finding is consistent with many previous studies: Easley and O’Hara (1987), Hasbrouck
(1991), and Barclay and Warner (1993), amongst others. The results for the entire 100
stocks are summarized in Table 6.4 below. Notice that the magnitude of the coefficient
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on the medium volume variable decreases as we increase the trade frequency, indicating
reduced liquidity in the market for less frequently traded stocks.
Table 6.4: Coefficients on the Vmed Variable.
Ask models: BUY*Vmed Bid models: SELL*Vmed
Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8 Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8
Median 0.1049 0.0757 0.0515 0.0465 -0.1650 -0.0759 -0.0651 -0.0454
Signif pos 15 24 25 25 0 0 0 0
Signif neg 0 0 0 0 20 25 25 25
NOTE: Signif pos  and Signif neg count the number of times this variable was significant at the 1% level, and
of the indicated sign. The maximum possible is 25.
Table 6.5 presents the results for the coefficients on the large volume trade indicator. The
reader can observe that the coefficients on this variable are less often significant than
those on the medium volume trade indicator, particularly for the less frequently traded
stocks. Recall that the proportion of trades with very large volumes is only slightly
larger for deciles 6 and 8, as reported in Table 3.1, but that the total number of trades for
stocks in these deciles is also larger. Thus there are many more large volume trades for
the frequently traded stocks than for the infrequently traded stocks. This larger number
provides a possible reason for the increased significance of the Vbig variable in the higher
deciles: a larger number of trades makes precise estimates of this coefficient possible,
that is, the coefficient may in truth be different from zero in the lower deciles also, but
we do not have enough observations of such large trades to estimate it accurately7.
                                                
7 In fact, for one stock (Fort Dearborn Income Securities) we did not observe any SELLs with
volume greater than 10,000 in the sample period, meaning that for this stock we had to force the
impact of a large trade to be symmetric – we used the variable (BUY-SELL)*Vbig rather than each
variable separately.
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The magnitudes of the coefficients on the medium and large volume trade indicators are
roughly equal; certainly close enough that we cannot detect a significant statistical
difference between the two. Thus we can reject the hypothesis that quote price impacts
are monotonic in trade volume.
Table 6.5: Coefficients on the Vbig Variable.
Ask models: BUY*Vbig Bid models: SELL*Vbig
Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8 Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8
Median 0.1028 0.0827 0.0615 0.0587 -0.1126 -0.0670 -0.0601 -0.0526
Signif pos 7 10 19 25 0 0 0 0
Signif neg 0 0 0 0 7 9 18 25
NOTE: Signif pos  and Signif neg count the number of times this variable was significant at the 1% level, and
of the indicated sign. The maximum possible is 25 for all deciles except Decile 2, which has a potential
maximum of 24 (see footnote 7).
6.5. What kind of news is no news?
No news is no news, it seems. The coefficient on Dlng, indicating a trade with duration
greater than five minutes, was not significant at all in the stocks from the second and
fourth decile, and only significant in one of the quote price series of each of the sixth and
eighth decile stocks. For the full sample we find that the long duration variable is
significant only 14 times out of a potential 200. The few times that we do find it
significant, the coefficient is usually of the opposite sign to the coefficient on the lagged
BUY and lagged SELL variables.
This indicates that a trade occurring after a period longer than five minutes with no
trades has either the same impact (coefficient not significant) or slightly less impact
(coefficient significant and of the opposite sign to the lagged BUY/SELL variable) than a
23
medium duration trade; one which occurred after one to five minute period of no trades.
These findings add further support to the theoretical assertion of Easley and O’Hara
(1992) that long durations mean no news, and so a trade that occurs after a long duration
is likely to be liquidity trade rather than one based on valuable information.
Short durations, on the other hand, are significant in most of the four representative
stocks’ results (short duration BUYs were not significant for the Decile 2 and 4 stocks),
when multiplied by the appropriate trade indicator variable. In all cases we find that the
sign of the coefficient is such that a short duration trade has a larger impact than a
medium or long duration trade, consistent with the findings of Dufour and Engle (2000).
The results for the entire data set for this variable are presented in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6: Coefficients on the Dsht Variable.
Ask models: BUY*Dsht Bid models: SELL*Dsht
Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8 Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8
Median 0.0660 0.0308 0.0206 0.0112 -0.0850 -0.0457 -0.0239 -0.0125
Signif pos 6 13 19 23 0 0 0 0
Signif neg 0 0 0 0 12 16 20 20
NOTE: Signif pos  and Signif neg count the number of times this variable was significant at the 1% level, and
of the indicated sign. The maximum possible is 25.
As the above table shows, the coefficient on the short duration variable (multiplied by
the appropriate BUY/SELL indicator) decreases in magnitude, but increases in
significance as we increase the average trade frequency. Short durations are more rare in
the lower deciles than in the higher deciles, by construction, and so we would expect
trades with short durations to have a larger impact on the price of infrequently traded
stocks than they do on frequently traded stocks.
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An alternative explanation of the increased magnitudes of the coefficients on short
duration trades in the lower deciles is provided by Easley et al. (1996) who find evidence
that the risk of trading with an informed agent is higher for infrequently traded stocks
than it is for frequently traded stocks. Such an increase would explain why trades have a
larger quote price impact for less frequently traded stocks.
6.6. Inventory Balance vs. Asymmetric Information Effects
The question of which of the inventory balance or the asymmetric information effects is
strongest can be answered by looking at the sign and significance of the coefficient on
the lagged difference in depths posted at the previous quote8. A significant positive
coefficient would indicate that the inventory balance effect is stronger than the
asymmetric information effect, and a negative coefficient the opposite. In all eight of the
quote price models presented in Table 6.1, and for 170 out of the 200 quote price models
estimated in total, we find that the coefficient on this variable is negative and significant.
This is consistent with the asymmetric information hypothesis dominating the inventory
balance effect.
While the sign and significance of this variable is consistent across the deciles studied,
the magnitude of the variable exhibits some variation. Table 6.7 below presents some
summary statistics on this coefficient across the deciles.
                                                
8 Note that the quote from which we take the depths for this variable was the last quote with a
change in one of the quoted prices, that is, the previous quote in the thinned quote price data set.
This may not be the most recently posted quote. We also estimated the model with the most
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Table 6.7: Coefficients on the DPTH_DIFF Variable.
Decile 2 Decile 4 Decile 6 Decile 8
Median -0.0670 -0.0402 -0.0289 -0.0238
Signif pos          4          8        10          6
Signif neg         45         41        40        44
NOTE: Signif pos  and Signif neg count the number of times this variable was significant at the 1% level, and
of the indicated sign. The maximum possible is 50.
The above results indicate that the magnitude of this coefficient decreases as we increase
the average trade frequency. The median coefficient in the second decile is 2.8 times
larger than that coefficient in the eighth decile. The decrease in the magnitude of this
coefficient as we move upwards through the trade frequency deciles suggests that the
strength of the asymmetric information (or barrier effect) relative to the inventory
balance effect is greater for less frequently traded stocks. As mentioned above, Easley et
al. (1996) report evidence suggesting that the risk of trading with an informed trader is
higher for infrequently traded stocks, which could serve as an explanation for the above
observation that the coefficient on the quote depths difference variable is larger for these
stocks than for frequently traded stocks.
6.7. Deterministic Time-of-Day Effects
The results of the estimation of the coefficients on the diurnal variables can be found at
the bottom of Table A.2. As one can see from this table, very few of these coefficients are
significant. The spline coefficient corresponding to the opening thirty minutes of trading
is generally significant (132 times out of 200), but very few others, suggesting that a
deterministic time-of-day effect is not an important source of variation in the quote price
                                                                                                                                                
recent difference in quote depths, and the results were (somewhat surprisingly) very similar to
those presented above.
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series. Dufour and Engle (2000) and Hasbrouck (1999) conclude similarly that only the
beginning of the trade day displays a significant deterministic component.
7. THE IMPLIED MODELS FOR THE SPREAD AND MID-QUOTE
Having a model for each of the bid and the ask prices enables us to extract a model for
the spread and mid-quote, two of the more commonly modeled market microstructure
variables. Obtaining the estimates of the coefficients and their standard errors in the
implied model for the spread and mid-quote is straightforward once the complete
covariance matrix of the coefficients in the models for the ask and the bid is determined:
we simply pre-multiply by a rotation matrix (with a 1 and –1 in the first row, and a ½
and ½ in the bottom row) to find the coefficient matrix. To obtain the variance-
covariance matrix of these coefficients we pre-multiply by the same rotation matrix, and
post-multiply by the transpose of the rotation matrix.
The results for implied models for the spread and the mid-quote are presented in Table
7.1, below. The model for the spread is presented in the (log) level, as this variable is
stationary, while the model for the mid-quote is presented in log-differences. From the
results for the spread and mid-quote models we can look at many of the above
hypotheses, and in addition, the spread and the mid-quote are the natural variables to
look at when examining long-run impacts.
The model for the spread is particularly interesting as the spread is a common measure
of friction in the market. A large spread indicates a high cost to a trader wishing to
execute a trade quickly; a high cost of immediacy in Stoll’s (2000) terminology.
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7.1. Asymmetric Impacts of BUYs and SELLs
The results presented in Table 7.2 indicate that BUYs and SELLs both have a positive
impact on the spread, while the former has a positive impact, and the latter a negative
impact, on the mid-quote. That both types of trades have a positive impact on the spread
is in accordance with economic intuition: both a buy and a sell involve a trader initiating
a trade with the market maker that they cannot immediately reverse without incurring a
loss (due to the positive bid-ask spread). Such a trade is a signal to the market maker,
and as such we would expect the spread to increase. This finding, combined with the
results of Easley and O’Hara (1992), suggests that there is more than one information
event per day – not an unexpected result.
As expected, we find that a BUY increases the mid-quote on average, while a SELL
decreases it.
Table 7.2: Coefficients on BUYt (t)-1 and SELLt (t)-1 Variables in the models for the
Spread and Mid-Quote
BUY SELLSpread
Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8 Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8
Median 0.0782 0.0589 0.0480 0.0325 0.0376 0.0481 0.0352 0.0236
Signif pos 9 22 24 25 7 17 24 23
Signif neg 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
BUY SELLMid-Quote
Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8 Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8
Median 0.1639 0.0917 0.0668 0.0468 -0.1473 -0.0687 -0.0566 -0.0403
Signif pos 21 24 25 25 0 0 0 0
Signif neg 0 0 0 0 20 24 25 25
NOTE: Signif pos  and Signif neg count the number of times this variable was significant at the 1% level, and
of the indicated sign. The maximum possible is 25.
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For the four representative stocks we find that all of the coefficients on lagged BUYs and
SELLs in both the models for the spread and the mid-quote are significant, and of the
signs suggested in the above paragraph, except for the coefficient on SELLt (t)-1 in the
Decile 2 stock’s spread model. When expand this to the full sample of 100 stocks, strong
evidence of this is found for all but the second decile.
In the model for the mid-quote, on the other hand, we find that the coefficient on BUYs
is significant and positive and the coefficient on SELLs is significant and negative for
almost all stocks in all deciles. The coefficients in the lower deciles tend to be larger (in
absolute value) and more variable than those in the higher deciles.
We find little evidence of asymmetry in the impacts of BUYs and SELLs on the spread
and the change in the mid-quote. In the models of the mid-quote we find no significant
evidence, and in the models for the spread we find some weak evidence that a BUY has
a larger impact than a SELL. For the other trade variables (those including indicator
variables for the volume or the duration of the trade) we find no evidence of asymmetry
in the impacts of BUYs or SELLs on either the spread or the mid-quote.
7.2. Does Trade Size Matter?
The results for the implied models for both the spread and the mid-quote indicate that
trade size is important for both. Again we find that medium volume trades generally
have significant coefficients in all deciles, with the expected signs, see Table 7.3. The
significance increases as we increase the average trade frequency, a feature that seems
common to all of our results.
29
Table 7.3: Coefficients on the  BUY*Vmed and SELL*Vmed variable in the model for the
Spread
BUY SELL
Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8 Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8
Median 0.0743 0.0503 0.0382 0.0349 0.1148 0.0484 0.0459 0.0390
Signif pos 9 18 25 25 16 20 25 25
Signif neg 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NOTE: Signif pos  and Signif neg count the number of times this variable was significant at the 1% level, and
of the indicated sign. The maximum possible is 25.
As Table 7.4 shows, the decrease in the magnitude and increase in significance of the
coefficients on medium volume trades are also present in the model for the mid-quote.
Table 7.4: Coefficients on the  BUY*Vmed and SELL*Vmed variable in the model for the
Mid-Quote
BUY SELL
Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8 Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8
Median 0.0677 0.0469 0.0398 0.0280 -0.1076 -0.0515 -0.0399 -0.0259
Signif pos 13 22 25 25 0 0 0 0
Signif neg 0 0 0 0 19 24 25 25
NOTE: Signif pos  and Signif neg count the number of times this variable was significant at the 1% level, and
of the indicated sign. The maximum possible is 25.
The coefficients on the large volume trades, presented in summary form in Table 7.5,
were only rarely significant in the lower two deciles, and only marginally significant in
decile six. Decile 8 again had the highest significance rate. The magnitudes of the
coefficients on large volume trades indicate that large volume trades have roughly the
same short-run impact as medium volume trades on both the spread and the mid-quote.
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Table 7.5: Coefficients on the  BUY*Vbig and SELL*Vbig variable in the models for the
Spread and Mid-Quote
BUY SELLSpread
Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8 Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8
Median 0.1127 0.0444 0.0319 0.0462 0.0120 0.0362 0.0269 0.0382
Signif pos 6 6 14 22 6 4 12 23
Signif neg 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BUY SELLMid-Quote
Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8 Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8
Median 0.0705 0.0578 0.0398 0.0387 -0.0980 -0.0402 -0.0409 -0.0317
Signif pos 5 4 18 24 0 0 0 0
Signif neg 0 0 0 0 7 7 18 23
NOTE: Signif pos  and Signif neg count the number of times this variable was significant at the 1% level, and
of the indicated sign. The maximum possible is 25 for all deciles except Decile 2, which has a potential
maximum of 24 (see footnote 7).
7.3. What kind of news is no news?
Again we find that no news is no news – just a handful of the coefficients on the long
duration indicator are significant, out of a possible 200, in both the model for the spread
and the model for the mid-quote. This implies that a trade with duration longer than 5
minutes has the same impact on the spread and the mid-quote that a trade with duration
of between 60 seconds and 5 minutes.
Table 7.6: Coefficients on the  BUY*Dsht and SELL*Dsht variable in the models for the
Spread and Mid-Quote
BUY SELLSpread
Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8 Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8
Median 0.0433 0.0199 0.0158 0.0145 0.0776 0.0317 0.0189 0.0131
Signif pos 4 7 15 23 6 12 15 21
Signif neg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BUY SELLMid-Quote Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8 Dec 2 Dec 4 Dec 6 Dec 8
Median 0.0352 0.0245 0.0122 0.0070 -0.0450 -0.0284 -0.0127 -0.0056
Signif pos 4 10 12 18 0 0 0 0
Signif neg 0 0 0 0 7 16 12 15
NOTE: Signif pos  and Signif neg count the number of times this variable was significant at the 1% level, and
of the indicated sign. The maximum possible is 25.
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Short duration trades, those with durations shorter than 60 seconds, exhibit the same
trends that we observed in the models for the bid and the ask: the magnitude of the
coefficients decreases as we increase the average trade frequency, but the significance
increases.
7.4. Inventory Balance vs. Asymmetric Information Effects
As discussed above, the coefficient on the lagged difference in quote depths indicates the
relative strengths of the impacts of the inventory balance and asymmetric information
effects. (The model for the spread is not relevant in answering this question.) For 86 of
the 100 stocks we find that this coefficient is negative and significant; substantial
evidence indicating that the asymmetric information effect dominates the inventory
effect. The same result was found in the models for the bid and the ask prices, and
related to the results of Huang and Stoll (1994), though the result in this section relates
more directly, as the aforementioned authors examined the mid-quote and not the
individual quote prices separately.
7.5. Deterministic Time-of-Day Effects
A number of previous studies, see Chan et al. (1995), and Wei (1992), amongst others,
have reported the presence of a U-shaped time-of-day pattern in the spread. We find
substantial evidence  of increased spreads at the beginning of the trade day (all but four
stocks have a significant negative coefficient on the first diurnal adjustment variable) but
we find no evidence of an increase in average spreads towards the end of the trade day.
Thus, by conditioning on the lagged quote and trade variables we are able to explain the
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increase in spreads towards the end of the trade day, but we are not able to do so for the
beginning of the trade day.
As in the bid and ask price models, the deterministic diurnal effect is not significant for
the mid-quote.
7.6. Long-Run Impact of a Trade
Estimating a model comprised of the bid and ask prices appeared to be a neat way to
capture short-run asymmetries, but the natural variables to look at for long-run impacts
are the spread and the mid-quote. We are able to back out the long run impacts on the
bid and ask price by performing the inverse of the rotation applied to obtain the spread
and the mid-quote in the first place, if so desired.
In calculating the long-run impacts of a trade we need to determine an appropriate
value for k(t), the number of trades between quote t-1 and quote t. Table 3.1 suggests
that a reasonable figure is one, as for all deciles this is the integer nearest both the mean
and median of k(t).
In Tables 7.7 and 7.8 we present the long-run impacts of a variety of types of trades on
the spread and the mid-quote. The figures reported are the median long-run impacts for
each decile.
Table 7.7 shows that there is substantial variation in the impacts on the spread of trades
with different characteristics.  Short duration, medium volume trades have the largest
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impacts on the spread, while the type of trade with the smallest impact seems to vary. In
general medium to long duration, small volume trades have the smallest impacts.
Turning now to the long-run impacts of trades on the mid-quote, we present Table 7.8.
Similar to the results presented for the spread, we find that short duration trades with
medium to large volumes have the largest long-run impacts on the mid-quote. Small
volume trades with medium to long durations have the smallest long-run impacts.
 The fact that all but one of the trades with the largest impacts on both the spread and
the mid-quote are those with short durations indicates the importance of the time
between trades in explaining the impact of a trade on quote prices, supporting the
findings of Dufour and Engle (2000). That medium and large volume trades have the
largest impacts also supports the findings of Hasbrouck (1991).
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we conducted an empirical investigation of the quote price dynamics of a
range of NYSE-listed stocks. We used 1997 data to sort stocks into trade frequency
deciles, and then selected 25 stocks from each of the second, fourth, sixth and eighth
deciles (where the first decile contains the least frequently traded and the tenth decile
contains the most frequently traded stocks). We estimated a vector autoregression on the
log-difference of the bid and the ask prices with the lagged log spread as the error-
correction term, and including as regressors the lagged difference in the depths posted
at the ask and bid prices and indicator variables for the volume and duration
characteristics of the most recent trade.
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We find that the lagged spread is very significant in all of the stocks’ models, and has a
sign indicating that it behaves as an error-correction term for the bid and the ask price.
Large spreads lead to falls in the ask price and rises in the bid price, moving the spread
toward its equilibrium level. Conversely, small spreads lead to increases in the ask price
and falls in the bid price. To the authors’ knowledge the error-correcting behaviour of
the spread has not been explicitly modeled before.
Strong evidence of asymmetry in the impacts of buyer-initiated trades versus seller-
initiated trades on the bid and the ask prices are found. Agents wishing to purchase the
stock must do so at the ask, and those wishing to sell must do so at the bid, providing a
solid reason to expect that a BUY has a larger impact on the ask price than does a SELL,
with the opposite holding true for the bid price.
We constructed indicator variables for trade durations and volumes, breaking them into
short, medium and long, and small, medium and large, respectively. Short durations
and medium volume trades were found to be the most significant, and to generally have
the largest long-run impacts, a finding that was consistent across the deciles. Large
volume trades had a significant impact on the bid and ask prices of the frequently
traded stocks, but not on the infrequently traded stocks. Long durations were not found
to have a significantly different impact than medium durations. A consistent finding for
all coefficients and long-run impacts was that the magnitudes of coefficients in the lower
deciles tended to be greater, the significance of these coefficients were reduced.
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Finally, we allowed for deterministic time-of-day effects in quoted prices, through the
inclusion of eight diurnal adjustment indicator variables. These variables were generally
not significant in the models for the bid, ask and mid-quote, though some significance
was found for them in the model for the spread. Specifically, spreads seem to be higher
at the start of the trade day.
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TABLE 3.1: Description of the Data
Decile 2 Decile 4 Decile 6 Decile 8
Representative stocks: GBX TEC OC GAP
                                       Panel A:  Trades
Min 1,903 4,514 13,818 29,275
Max 18,203 34,162 54,411 170,232
Median 3,663 10,549 26,737 56,733







Representative stock 5,366 13,995 27,912 48,344
BUYS 0.3872 0.4058 0.4278 0.4388
SELLS 0.5018 0.4961 0.4654 0.4731
Mid-quote 0.1110 0.0981 0.1068 0.0880
V(small) 0.7522 0.8085 0.7704 0.7452
V(medium) 0.2297 0.1815 0.2112 0.2310
V(big) 0.0181 0.0100 0.0184 0.0238
D(short) 0.2589 0.2932 0.3558 0.4744










D(long) 0.6108 0.5044 0.3430 0.1831
                                       Panel B:  Quotes
Min 3,141 5,083 19,439 33,463
Max 96,380 42,044 77,100 172,800
Median 6,427 21,022 43,467 90,465







Representative stock 12,333 23,309 56,270 108,734
No price change (%) 0.5601 0.5925 0.4973 0.4519
                                       Panel C:  Thinned Quotes
Min 758 2,656 8,893 18,462
Max 25,589 24,281 39,034 96,817
Median 3,898 12,934 20,427 37,597







Representative stock 7,561 14,840 30,252 46,021
Change <= -2 ticks 0.0561 0.0712 0.0507 0.0431
Change = -1 tick 0.0895 0.0893 0.0797 0.0781
Change = 0 ticks 0.7120 0.6819 0.7409 0.7592






Change >= +2 ticks 0.0553 0.0705 0.0503 0.0432
Median number of trades
between quotes 0.7697 0.8624 1.1776 1.4686
Mean number of trades
between quotes 1.2137 0.9884 1.2818 1.4397
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TABLE 4.1: Description of the Variables
Variable Description
              Quote variables
Dlog(ASKt) Log difference of the ask price between quote t and quote t-1.
Dlog(BIDt) Log difference of the bid price between quote t and quote t-1.
SPRt The spread in logs: log(ASKt) - log(BIDt).
DEPTH_DIFFt The difference between the log of the quote depth at the ask price and
the log of the quote depth at the bid price at quote t.
               Trade  variables
k(t) The number of trades between quote t and quote t-1.
t(t)-j Denotes the jth most recent trade at quote t.
BUYt (t)-j Buy indicator: equals 1 if k(t) ³ j and the jth most recent trade at quote
t was identified as a buy, else this variable equals 0.
SELLt (t)-j Sell indicator: equals 1 if k(t) ³ j and the jth most recent trade at quote t
was identified as a sell, else this variable equals 0.
med
j)t(V -t Medium volume trade indicator: equals 1 if the jth most recent trade at
quote t had volume between 1,000 and 10,000 shares, else this variable
equals 0.
big
j)t(V -t Large volume trade indicator: : equals 1 if the jth most recent trade at
quote t had volume of over 10,000 shares, else this variable equals 0.
sht
j)t(D -t Short duration trade indicator: equals 1 if the jth most recent trade at
quote t had a duration less than 60 seconds, else this variable equals 0.
gln
j)t(D -t Long duration trade indicator: : equals 1 if the jth most recent trade at
quote t had duration longer than 5 minutes, else this variable equals 0.
               Deterministic  variables
d
tDIURN Diurnal adjustment variable: The value of the dth diurnal indicator
variable at quote t.
Table 6.1: Summary of results for the representative stocks.
22/08/00 5:28 Decile 2 - GBX Decile 4 - TEC Decile 6 - OC Decile 8 - GAP
Variable Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid
-0.1329* 0.1592* -0.1150* 0.1640* -0.1200* 0.1552* -0.1836* 0.1474*SPRt-1
(0.0198) (0.0178) (0.0143) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0240) (0.0162) (0.0093)
-0.0672* -0.0409* -0.0562* -0.0449* -0.0245* -0.0257* -0.0257* -0.0265*DEPTH_DIFFt-1
(0.0056) (0.0054) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.001) (0.0008)
0.1816* 0.1208* 0.1416* 0.0586* 0.0774* 0.0251* 0.0624* 0.0313*BUYt(t)-1
(0.0207) (0.0186) (0.0119) (0.0103) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0022)
-0.1310* -0.1822* -0.0699* -0.134* -0.0214* -0.0591* -0.0248* -0.0390*SELLt(t)-1
(0.0229) (0.0239) (0.0095) (0.0114) (0.0028) (0.0046) (0.0024) (0.0021)
-0.0015 -0.0053 0.0092 -0.0012 0.0018 0.0021 0.0031* -0.0003S (BUY)t(t)-1
(0.0058) (0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0008)
0.0183 0.0130 -0.0066 -0.0077 0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0021* -0.0030*S (SELL)t(t)-1
(0.0090) (0.0081) (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0007) (0.0007)
0.1049* 0.0306 0.1042* 0.0455* 0.0481* 0.0152* 0.0494* 0.0097*BUYt(t)-1*Vt(t)-1med
(0.0216) (0.0181) (0.0117) (0.0099) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0021)
-0.0384 -0.1532* -0.0418* -0.1102* -0.0086* -0.0546* -0.0092* -0.0526*SELt(t)-1*Vt(t)-1med
(0.0191) (0.0218) (0.0110) (0.0137) (0.0026) (0.0041) (0.0025) (0.0029)
0.0988 -0.0713 0.0393 0.0076 0.0663* 0.0028 0.0769* 0.0082BUYt(t)-1*Vt(t)-1big
(0.0481) (0.0372) (0.056) (0.0366) (0.0137) (0.0089) (0.0127) (0.0071)
-0.1071* -0.1064 -0.0904 -0.1056 0.0041 -0.0181 -0.0015 -0.0397*SELt(t)-1*Vt(t)-1big
(0.0403) (0.0534) (0.0380) (0.0529) (0.0091) (0.0128) (0.0093) (0.0107)
0.0453 0.0020 0.0320 0.0224 0.0224* -0.0025 0.0105* -0.0040BUYt(t)-1*Dt(t)-1sht
(0.0243) (0.0242) (0.0128) (0.0101) (0.0042) (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.002)
-0.0303 -0.1115* -0.0083 -0.0597* -0.0021 -0.0284* 0.0017 -0.0087*SELt(t)-1*Dt(t)-1sht
(0.0260) (0.0272) (0.0112) (0.0142) (0.0031) (0.0055) (0.0021) (0.0023)
-0.0224 -0.0301 0.0085 0.0225 -0.0091* -0.0076 -0.0031 -0.0016BUYt(t)-1*Dt(t)-1lng
(0.0200) (0.0187) (0.0124) (0.0092) (0.0034) (0.0054) (0.0032) (0.0023)
0.0089 -0.0285 0.0138 -0.0165 -0.0026 0.0077 -0.0089* 0.0011SELt(t)-1*Dt(t)-1lng
(0.0209) (0.0231) (0.0093) (0.0128) (0.0026) (0.0041) (0.0024) (0.0026)
41.88 39.61 70.10 69.67 126.95 126.46 217.65 167.76F-stat
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.337 0.325 0.300 0.299 0.275 0.274 0.299 0.248
Table 7.1: Implied models for the spread and the mid-quote: summary of results for the representative stocks.
Decile 2 – GBX Decile 4 – TEC Decile 6 – OC Decile 8 - GAP
Variable Spread Mid-Quote Spread Mid-Quote Spread Mid-Quote Spread Mid-Quote
-0.0263* -0.0541* -0.0114* -0.0505* 0.0012 -0.0251* 0.0008 -0.0261*DEPTH_DIFFt-1
(0.0061) (0.0046) (0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0007)
0.0608* 0.1512* 0.0830* 0.1001* 0.0523* 0.0512* 0.0311* 0.0468*BUYt(t)-1
(0.0221) (0.0163) (0.0125) (0.0092) (0.0040) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0024)
0.0512 -0.1566* 0.0641* -0.1020* 0.0377* -0.0402* 0.0142* -0.0319*SELLt(t)-1
(0.0251) (0.0197) (0.0125) (0.0084) (0.0045) (0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0018)
0.0038 -0.0034 0.0104 0.0040 -0.0002 0.0020 0.0034* 0.0014S (BUY)t(t)-1
(0.0051) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0036) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0008)
0.0053 0.0157 0.0011 -0.0072* 0.0020 -0.0001 0.0010 -0.0026*S (SELL)t(t)-1
(0.0094) (0.0072) (0.0038) (0.0027) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0005)
0.0743* 0.0677* 0.0586* 0.0748* 0.0329* 0.0317* 0.0397* 0.0296*BUYt(t)-1*Vt(t)-1med
(0.0235) (0.0161) (0.0126) (0.0088) (0.0046) (0.0027) (0.0038) (0.0021)
0.1148* -0.0958* 0.0685* -0.0760* 0.0459* -0.0316* 0.0434* -0.0309*SELt(t)-1*Vt(t)-1med
(0.0242) (0.0165) (0.0135) (0.0104) (0.0046) (0.0025) (0.0037) (0.0020)
0.1701* 0.0138 0.0318 0.0235 0.0635* 0.0346* 0.0687* 0.0426*BUYt(t)-1*Vt(t)-1big
(0.0561) (0.0325) (0.0439) (0.0419) (0.0157) (0.0085) (0.0148) (0.0072)
-0.0007 -0.1067* 0.0152 -0.0980 0.0222 -0.0070 0.0382* -0.0206*SELt(t)-1*Vt(t)-1big
(0.0541) (0.0388) (0.0449) (0.0402) (0.0144) (0.0084) (0.0144) (0.0070)
0.0433 0.0237 0.0096 0.0272* 0.0249* 0.0100* 0.0145* 0.0032BUYt(t)-1*Dt(t)-1sht
(0.0277) (0.0200) (0.0136) (0.0093) (0.0045) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0020)
0.0812* -0.0709* 0.0513* -0.0340* 0.0263* -0.0152* 0.0104* -0.0035SELt(t)-1*Dt(t)-1sht
(0.0285) (0.0224) (0.0146) (0.0105) (0.0051) (0.0037) (0.0029) (0.0017)
0.0077 -0.0263 -0.0140 0.0155 -0.0014 -0.0084 -0.0015 -0.0024BUYt(t)-1*Dt(t)-1long
(0.0221) (0.0159) (0.0130) (0.0087) (0.0061) (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0021)
0.0375 -0.0098 0.0303 -0.0013 -0.0103 0.0026 -0.0100* -0.0039SELt(t)-1*Dt(t)-1long
(0.0238) (0.0185) (0.0136) (0.0089) (0.0045) (0.0026) (0.0033) (0.0019)
Table 7.7: Long-Run Impacts of Various Types of Trades on the Spread
        Panel A: Decile 2
BUY Dshort Dmedium Dlong SELL Dshort Dmedium Dlong
   Vsmall 0.3291 0.1348 0.1657    Vsmall 0.4007 0.2410 0.2157
   Vmedium 0.5400 0.1592 0.2943    Vmedium 1.0139 0.8088 0.4616
   Vlarge 0.3209 0.0303 0.1357    Vlarge 0.4815 0.1258 0.2617
        Panel B: Decile 4
BUY Dshort Dmedium Dlong SELL Dshort Dmedium Dlong
   Vsmall 0.2366 0.2031 0.1395    Vsmall 0.3071 0.1417 0.1702
   Vmedium 0.2670 0.2709 0.2159    Vmedium 0.3402 0.1912 0.2065
   Vlarge 0.2663 0.2145 0.2873    Vlarge 0.3508 0.1547 0.1623
        Panel C: Decile 6
BUY Dshort Dmedium Dlong SELL Dshort Dmedium Dlong
   Vsmall 0.2271 0.1418 0.1746    Vsmall 0.2282 0.1637 0.1502
   Vmedium 0.3230 0.2448 0.2731    Vmedium 0.3099 0.2340 0.2784
   Vlarge 0.2466 0.1965 0.1745    Vlarge 0.1759 0.1055 0.1169
        Panel D: Decile 8
BUY Dshort Dmedium Dlong SELL Dshort Dmedium Dlong
   Vsmall 0.1912 0.1164 0.1024    Vsmall 0.1365 0.0583 0.0544
   Vmedium 0.2857 0.2202 0.2047    Vmedium 0.2329 0.1839 0.1963
   Vlarge 0.2089 0.1796 0.1562    Vlarge 0.2001 0.1294 0.1158
NOTE: This table presents the median long-run impact of nine different types of trades for each decile. The
reader is referred to Table 4.1 for definitions of the various trade characteristic indicator variables.
Table 7.8: Long-Run Impacts of Various Types of Trades on the Mid-Quote
        Panel A: Decile 2
BUY Dshort Dmedium Dlong SELL Dshort Dmedium Dlong
   Vsmall 0.3445 0.1869 0.1592    Vsmall -0.2994 -0.1224 -0.1777
   Vmedium 0.4424 0.2713 0.2419    Vmedium -0.4424 -0.2835 -0.2769
   Vlarge 0.4343 0.3047 0.2815    Vlarge -0.2768 -0.1180 -0.1872
        Panel B: Decile 4
BUY Dshort Dmedium Dlong SELL Dshort Dmedium Dlong
   Vsmall 0.1834 0.1346 0.1162    Vsmall -0.1470 -0.0737 -0.0946
   Vmedium 0.2601 0.1932 0.1862    Vmedium -0.2145 -0.1454 -0.1729
   Vlarge 0.2529 0.2061 0.1882    Vlarge -0.2000 -0.1247 -0.1370
        Panel C: Decile 6
BUY Dshort Dmedium Dlong SELL Dshort Dmedium Dlong
   Vsmall 0.1177 0.0804 0.0778    Vsmall -0.0855 -0.0601 -0.0633
   Vmedium 0.1545 0.1426 0.1296    Vmedium -0.1395 -0.1152 -0.1115
   Vlarge 0.1681 0.1362 0.1294    Vlarge -0.1138 -0.1069 -0.1097
        Panel D: Decile 8
BUY Dshort Dmedium Dlong SELL Dshort Dmedium Dlong
   Vsmall 0.0725 0.0583 0.0544    Vsmall -0.0673 -0.0443 -0.0494
   Vmedium 0.1206 0.0982 0.0912    Vmedium -0.0920 -0.0811 -0.0880
   Vlarge 0.1309 0.1181 0.1117    Vlarge -0.0912 -0.0729 -0.0748
NOTE: This table presents the median long-run impact of nine different types of trades for each decile. The
reader is referred to Table 4.1 for definitions of the various trade characteristic indicator variables.
A1.  Appendix 1
Table A.1: Companies included in the sample. (An asterix indicates that this is a
representative stock.)
Mean number of trades / day:
Ticker Company Name
         Jan 1997
to Dec 1997
    Jan   1998
to  June 1999
        Panel A:  Decile 2
HTD HUNTINGDON LIFE SCIENCE GP 8.38 7.04
BE BENGUET CORP 11.54 15.68
PDC PRESLEY COMPANIES 8.45 14.53
ABG GROUPE AB S A ADS 11.55 5.62
LSB LSB INDUSTRIES INC 8.52 8.47
GBX* GREENBRIER COMPANIES INC 9.89 14.20
STC STEWART INFORMATION SVCS CORP 8.00 48.16
DTC DOMTAR INC 10.17 11.34
PCZ PETRO-CANADA VARIABLE VTG SHS 12.35 12.89
TGN TRIGEN ENERGY CORP  COMMON 7.29 8.78
SGD SCOTTS LIQUID GOLD INC 12.52 11.31
OFG ORIENTAL FINL GRP HOLD CO. 10.93 19.69
JNS CHIC BY H.I.S. INC 9.45 10.74
JAX J ALEXANDER S CORP. 7.55 7.46
HUN HUNT CORP 11.29 16.13
TPR TRANSPRO INC. 11.79 8.40
VHI VALHI INC 10.08 9.47
MIG MEADOWBROOK INSURANCE GRP INC 10.30 14.33
PIC PICCADILLY CAFETERIAS INC 12.19 9.42
GOT GOTTSCHALKS INC 12.05 9.63
GSE GUNDLE/SLT ENVIROMENTAL INC. 8.91 5.32
CSS CSS INDUSTRIES INC 9.42 9.68
SAJ ST JOSEPH LIGHT POWER CO 10.81 12.84
FTD FORT DEARBORN INCOME SECS 10.44 9.69
IAL INTERNATIONAL ALUMINUM CORP 7.27 5.03
        Panel B:  Decile 4
CNE CONNECTICUT ENERGY CORP 21.04 27.46
TEC* COMMERCIAL INTERTECH CORP 25.69 37.02
JC JENNY CRAIG INC 24.07 16.67
NRD NORD RESOURCES CORP 20.36 17.28
LSH LASALLE RE HOLDINGS LTD 20.09 33.54
PCU SOUTHERN PERU COPPER CORP 23.75 27.91
BOR BORG WARNER SECURITIES CORP 19.47 26.93
FC FRANKLIN COVEY CO. 20.93 38.63
CHP C D TECHNOLOGIES INC. 20.88 34.25






        Panel B (continued):  Decile 4
CGI COMMERCE GROUP INC 19.80 31.71
XTR XTRA CORP 21.44 34.52
FIC FAIR ISAAC AND CO INC 23.13 46.62
FED FIRSTFED FINANCIAL CORP 19.65 39.73
OSG OVERSEAS SHIPHOLDING GROUP 26.86 33.58
BKE BUCKLE INC 19.63 90.38
BNK CNB BANCSHARES INC 20.64 56.11
UAH UNITED AMER HEALTHCARE CORP 24.61 13.12
RGC REPUBLIC GROUP INC 25.29 26.62
RDO RDO EQUIPMENT CO 19.79 17.64
OXM OXFORD INDUSTRIES INC 25.48 21.30
FMN F   M NATIONAL CORP 24.09 31.68
FEP FRANKLIN ELECTRONIC PUBLISHER 19.56 11.94
PTC PAR TECHNOLOGY CORP 25.63 15.81
TSY TECH SYM CORP 20.02 13.44
BBR BUTLER MANUFACTURING CO 22.58 19.56
        Panel C:  Decile 6
TBY TCBY ENTERPRISE INC 50.12 65.69
OMM OMI CORPORATION NEW 39.50 41.27
FUN CEDAR FAIR DEP R L.P. 51.73 63.46
GRO MISSISSIPPI CHEMICAL CORP. 50.53 38.43
DGX QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INC. 48.44 36.56
WSO WATSCO INC 41.11 47.00
ASL ASHANTI GOLDFLDS 48.50 89.55
FA FAIRCHILD CORP CL 46.21 54.12
MPP GENERAL CIGAR HOLDINGS CL 55.33 57.34
CDI C D I CORP 44.04 52.00
IEI INDIANA ENERGY INC HLDG CO 49.79 51.53
LUK LEUCADIA NATIONAL CORP 45.63 77.59
CWC CARIBINER INTERNATIONAL INC 43.85 81.12
RDK RUDDICK CORP 51.71 70.73
WRC WORLD COLOR PRESS INC 46.54 76.68
BUR BURLINGTON INDS INC 48.82 83.88
CSL CARLISLE COMPANIES INC 51.63 91.04
OC* ORION CAPITAL CORP 40.04 73.84
PNM PUBLIC SERVICE NEW MEXICO 49.12 69.56
CNA CNA FINANCIAL CORP 39.26 70.38






        Panel C (continued):  Decile 6
PNR PENTAIR INC 39.09 77.13
ZLC ZALE CORP 55.55 102.04
RYN RAYONIER INC 49.24 73.17
LIN LINENS N THINGS INC. 44.01 143.94
PMS POLICY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS CORP 41.46 117.37
        Panel D:  Decile 8
RGR STURM RUGER   CO INC 83.23 77.47
AVX AVX CORP 96.50 77.45
WNC WABASH NATIONAL CORP 86.97 86.39
SEI SEITEL INC 113.66 97.97
ARG AIRGAS INC 111.91 93.31
FLM FLEMING COS INC 83.88 93.11
BRR BARRETT RESOURCES CORP 84.71 85.16
LTV LTV CORP NEW 113.90 131.87
PMI PREMARK INTERNATIONAL INC 84.12 95.89
TRN TRINITY INDUSTRIES 111.73 152.31
ASD AMERICAN STANDARD COS INC 119.90 120.76
TCB TCF FINANCIAL CORP 83.14 150.09
R RYDER SYSTEM INC 117.41 173.02
VTS VERITAS DGC INC. 122.57 232.06
SNC SNYDER COMMUNICATIONS INC. 82.61 197.24
GAS NICOR INCORPORATED 86.63 112.22
AVT AVNET INC 110.48 159.55
GAP* GREAT ATLANTIC   PAC TEA 92.77 127.89
DLP DELTA AND PINE LAND COMPANY 91.20 176.24
COX COX COMMUNICATIONS INC 82.94 245.96
FMO FEDERAL-MOGUL CORP 86.08 191.18
CTX CENTEX CORP 107.34 212.75
CP CANADIAN PACIFIC LTD ORD NEW 123.38 194.47
CNS CONSOLIDATED STORES CORP 106.44 275.42
DLJ DONALDSON LUF JENRETTE INC 93.45 450.35
Table A.2: Complete results for the representative stocks.
Decile 2 - GBX Decile 4 - TEC Decile 6 - OC Decile 8 - GAP
Variable Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid
-0.4277* 0.0978* -0.283* 0.1405* -0.2376* 0.1297* -0.2688* 0.0727*ASKt-1
(0.0331) (0.0248) (0.0198) (0.0173) (0.05) (0.0256) (0.0438) (0.019)
-0.2409* 0.0943* -0.1708* 0.1006* -0.1053* 0.1446* -0.1403* 0.0797*ASKt-2
(0.0284) (0.0221) (0.0293) (0.0191) (0.0213) (0.0242) (0.0185) (0.0097)
-0.2165* 0.0716* -0.1492* 0.1101* -0.0762* 0.1151* -0.1074* 0.0628*ASKt-3
(0.0259) (0.0218) (0.0199) (0.0167) (0.0146) (0.0193) (0.0118) (0.0081)
-0.1713* 0.0531 -0.1089* 0.0814* -0.0636* 0.0843* -0.0869* 0.0573*ASKt-4
(0.0259) (0.0219) (0.0161) (0.0158) (0.0122) (0.0179) (0.0101) (0.0073)
-0.1658* 0.0287 -0.0884* 0.0646* -0.0594* 0.0873* -0.0641* 0.0529*ASKt-5
(0.0232) (0.0205) (0.0145) (0.0137) (0.0104) (0.0144) (0.0094) (0.0067)
-0.1162* 0.0121 -0.0569* 0.0541* -0.0593* 0.0579* -0.0525* 0.0485*ASKt-6
(0.0213) (0.0189) (0.013) (0.0133) (0.01) (0.0123) (0.0083) (0.006)
-0.0992* 0.0164 -0.047* 0.0417* -0.0452* 0.0681* -0.044* 0.0357*ASKt-7
(0.0199) (0.0179) (0.0124) (0.0133) (0.009) (0.0123) (0.0077) (0.0059)
-0.0927* 0.0076 -0.0335* 0.0273 -0.0506* 0.0381* -0.028* 0.0282*ASKt-8
(0.0195) (0.0172) (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0088) (0.0114) (0.0064) (0.0052)
-0.0743* 0.0261 -0.0226 0.0283* -0.0303* 0.0261* -0.0192* 0.0168*ASKt-9
(0.0175) (0.015) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.008) (0.0082) (0.0059) (0.0047)
-0.0215 0.0265 -0.0023 0.0286* -0.0156 0.0078 -0.0183* 0.0037ASKt-10
(0.0134) (0.0117) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0055) (0.0037)
0.2336* -0.319* 0.1677* -0.2872* 0.0895* -0.3084* 0.1487* -0.1756*BIDt-1
(0.0227) (0.023) (0.0197) (0.0322) (0.0326) (0.0814) (0.0103) (0.0101)
0.2379* -0.0676* 0.1557* -0.1311* 0.106* -0.174* 0.1344* -0.0813*BIDt-2
(0.0264) (0.023) (0.0173) (0.0214) (0.0175) (0.0387) (0.0141) (0.01)
0.1979* -0.0774* 0.1302* -0.0978* 0.1002* -0.1285* 0.1146* -0.0795*BIDt-3
(0.0263) (0.0222) (0.0176) (0.0172) (0.0141) (0.0237) (0.0116) (0.0111)
0.1832* -0.0344 0.1026* -0.0749* 0.091* -0.0844* 0.0915* -0.0563*BIDt-4
(0.0248) (0.022) (0.0152) (0.015) (0.013) (0.0175) (0.0099) (0.0086)
0.1562* -0.038 0.0775* -0.063* 0.0713* -0.0701* 0.0692* -0.0468*BIDt-5
(0.0241) (0.0215) (0.0139) (0.0142) (0.0114) (0.0139) (0.0095) (0.0074)
0.1181* -0.0073 0.0661* -0.0432* 0.0525* -0.0584* 0.0587* -0.0405*BIDt-6
(0.022) (0.0205) (0.0133) (0.0132) (0.0098) (0.0119) (0.0085) (0.0067)
0.0936* -0.0083 0.052* -0.0482* 0.0552* -0.0446* 0.0489* -0.0466*BIDt-7
(0.0213) (0.0188) (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.009) (0.0098) (0.0072) (0.006)
0.0938* 0.0083 0.0377* -0.0175 0.0542* -0.0337* 0.039* -0.0341*BIDt-8
(0.0197) (0.018) (0.0106) (0.012) (0.0077) (0.0088) (0.0073) (0.0061)
Decile 2 - GBX Decile 4 - TEC Decile 6 - OC Decile 8 - GAP
Variable Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid
0.0796* -0.0175 0.0027 -0.0251 0.0264* -0.0159 0.031* -0.0202*BIDt-9
(0.0178) (0.0158) (0.01) (0.0105) (0.0073) (0.0075) (0.0062) (0.0058)
0.0381 0.0076 0.0054 -0.0173 0.0277* -0.0094 0.0142 0.0037BIDt-10
(0.0154) (0.014) (0.0084) (0.0087) (0.0068) (0.0056) (0.0061) (0.0056)
0.2523* -0.083* 0.1734* -0.1291* 0.0704* -0.0542* 0.0719* -0.075*constant
(0.0229) (0.0202) (0.0165) (0.0174) (0.0083) (0.0104) (0.0083) (0.0056)
-0.1329* 0.1592* -0.115* 0.164* -0.12* 0.1552* -0.1836* 0.1474*SPRt-1
(0.0198) (0.0178) (0.0143) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.024) (0.0162) (0.0093)
-0.0672* -0.0409* -0.0562* -0.0449* -0.0245* -0.0257* -0.0257* -0.0265*DPTH_DIFFt-1
(0.0056) (0.0054) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.001) (0.0008)
0.1816* 0.1208* 0.1416* 0.0586* 0.0774* 0.0251* 0.0624* 0.0313*BUYt(t)-1
(0.0207) (0.0186) (0.0119) (0.0103) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0022)
0.0525 -0.0004 0.0092 0.0058 0.0173* 0.0102 0.0168* 0.0104*BUYt(t)-2
(0.0227) (0.0179) (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0056) (0.004) (0.0042) (0.0025)
-0.016 0.0046 0.0015 0.0159 0.0033 -0.0041 0.0047 0.0026BUYt(t)-3
(0.0299) (0.0202) (0.0141) (0.0106) (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0022)
-0.007 -0.0236 0.0041 0.0041 0.0022 -0.0036 0.001 -0.0036BUYt(t)-4
(0.0197) (0.0188) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0048) (0.0033) (0.0024) (0.0021)
-0.0181 -0.0222 0.0097 0.0005 -0.0094 -0.0042 0.0035 -0.0015BUYt(t)-5
(0.0196) (0.0182) (0.0115) (0.0103) (0.0037) (0.0046) (0.0025) (0.0022)
-0.131* -0.1822* -0.0699* -0.134* -0.0214* -0.0591* -0.0248* -0.039*SELLt(t)-1
(0.0229) (0.0239) (0.0095) (0.0114) (0.0028) (0.0046) (0.0024) (0.0021)
-0.0457 -0.043 -0.005 -0.0186 -0.008 -0.014 -0.0057 -0.0068*SELLt(t)-2
(0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0109) (0.0122) (0.0034) (0.0061) (0.0023) (0.002)
-0.0312 -0.0163 0.0163 0.0151 -0.0013 0.0021 -0.0052 -0.002SELLt(t)-3
(0.0246) (0.0209) (0.0106) (0.0114) (0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0023) (0.0022)
-0.036 0.0018 0.0293* 0.0148 0.0031 -0.0003 -0.0016 -0.0028SELLt(t)-4
(0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0104) (0.0111) (0.0035) (0.0032) (0.0023) (0.0021)
-0.0114 -0.0355 0.0086 0.0021 0.0026 -0.0024 0.0064 0.0035SELLt(t)-5
(0.0292) (0.0287) (0.013) (0.0101) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0025) (0.0019)
-0.0015 -0.0053 0.0092 -0.0012 0.0018 0.0021 0.0031* -0.0003SBUYt(t)-1
(0.0058) (0.0037) (0.004) (0.0044) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.001) (0.0008)
-0.0052 0.0025 0.0036 0.0027 -0.0003 0.0017 0.0002 0.0031*SBUYt(t)-2
(0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0007)
0.0103 0.0036 0.001 0.0016 -0.0013 0.0006 -0.0012 0.0001SBUYt(t)-3
(0.0131) (0.004) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0007)
-0.0075 -0.0047 0.0035 0.0015 -0.0015 0.0011 -0.0016 0.0014SBUYt(t)-4
(0.0044) (0.005) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Decile 2 - GBX Decile 4 - TEC Decile 6 - OC Decile 8 - GAP
Variable Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid
-0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0004 0.0012 0.001 -0.0014 -0.0004 0.0003SBUYt(t)-5
(0.0047) (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0007)
0.0183 0.013 -0.0066 -0.0077 0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0021* -0.003*SSELLt(t)-1
(0.009) (0.0081) (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0007) (0.0007)
0.0001 -0.0022 -0.0047 -0.0038 -0.0028* -0.0026 -0.0014 -0.0006SSELLt(t)-2
(0.0068) (0.0069) (0.003) (0.0032) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0006)
0.0109 0.0149 -0.002 -0.0032 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0007 0.0007SSELLt(t)-3
(0.0099) (0.0084) (0.003) (0.0035) (0.001) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0006)
0.0096 0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0004 0.0008 -0.0003 0.0004SSELLt(t)-4
(0.0076) (0.0064) (0.003) (0.0038) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0008)
-0.0005 0.0086 0.0006 0.0019 -0.001 0.0019 -0.0006 0.0009SSELLt(t)-5
(0.0074) (0.0067) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0006) (0.0006)
0.1049* 0.0306 0.1042* 0.0455* 0.0481* 0.0152* 0.0494* 0.0097*BUYt(t)-1*Vt(t)-1med
(0.0216) (0.0181) (0.0117) (0.0099) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0021)
0.0143 0.0346 -0.002 0.0294* 0.0134* 0.0056 0.0109* 0.0133*BUYt(t)-2*Vt(t)-2med
(0.0208) (0.019) (0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0028)
-0.0375 -0.0144 0.0046 0.0186 0.0042 0.0026 0.002 0.0058BUYt(t)-3*Vt(t)-3med
(0.0199) (0.0187) (0.0106) (0.0102) (0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0031) (0.0027)
-0.0038 -0.054* 0.0006 0.0036 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.0026BUYt(t)-4*Vt(t)-4med
(0.0221) (0.0179) (0.0114) (0.0107) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.003)
0.0167 -0.0339 0.001 0.0198 0.0095* 0.0077 0.0067 0.0051BUYt(t)-5*Vt(t)-5med
(0.0192) (0.0174) (0.0111) (0.0102) (0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0025)
-0.0384 -0.1532* -0.0418* -0.1102* -0.0086* -0.0546* -0.0092* -0.0526*SELt(t)-1*Vt(t)-1med
(0.0191) (0.0218) (0.011) (0.0137) (0.0026) (0.0041) (0.0025) (0.0029)
-0.0221 -0.0282 -0.019 -0.0105 -0.0099* -0.0138 -0.0083* -0.0082*SEL t(t)-2*Vt(t)-2med
(0.0198) (0.0202) (0.0107) (0.013) (0.0036) (0.006) (0.0026) (0.0027)
0.0312 0.0323 -0.0112 0.0228 -0.0039 -0.0014 0.001 0.0026SEL t(t)-3*Vt(t)-3med
(0.0203) (0.0194) (0.0108) (0.011) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0032) (0.003)
-0.0221 0.0037 -0.0033 -0.0082 -0.0011 -0.0073 -0.0021 -0.0019SEL t(t)-4*Vt(t)-4med
(0.0206) (0.0204) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0027) (0.0027)
0.0271 0.0008 0.0134 -0.0033 0.0027 0 -0.0005 -0.0009SEL t(t)-5*Vt(t)-5med
(0.0209) (0.0182) (0.0102) (0.0121) (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.005) (0.0026)
0.0988 -0.0713 0.0393 0.0076 0.0663* 0.0028 0.0769* 0.0082BUYt(t)-1*Vt(t)-1big
(0.0481) (0.0372) (0.056) (0.0366) (0.0137) (0.0089) (0.0127) (0.0071)
0.0458 0.1186 -0.0983 -0.0269 -0.0052 -0.0096 0.0083 0.0343*BUYt(t)-2*Vt(t)-2 big
(0.042) (0.0534) (0.0888) (0.1175) (0.013) (0.0112) (0.0097) (0.01)
-0.021 0.0761 0.0492 -0.0015 0.0077 0.0091 -0.03* 0.0016BUYt(t)-3*Vt(t)-3 big
(0.0541) (0.0507) (0.0339) (0.0602) (0.015) (0.0143) (0.0096) (0.0082)
Decile 2 - GBX Decile 4 - TEC Decile 6 - OC Decile 8 - GAP
Variable Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid
0.0107 -0.0153 0.04 0.0796 0.0039 0.0087 -0.0135 0.0177BUYt(t)-4*Vt(t)-4 big
(0.0493) (0.0296) (0.0609) (0.0558) (0.0101) (0.0099) (0.0107) (0.0088)
0.0286 0.0167 -0.0088 -0.0058 -0.0113 0.0029 0.0064 0.0088BUYt(t)-5*Vt(t)-5 big
(0.0444) (0.0542) (0.0421) (0.0765) (0.0102) (0.0111) (0.0144) (0.0139)
-0.1071* -0.1064 -0.0904 -0.1056 0.0041 -0.0181 -0.0015 -0.0397*SELt(t)-1*Vt(t)-1 big
(0.0403) (0.0534) (0.038) (0.0529) (0.0091) (0.0128) (0.0093) (0.0107)
0.0447 0.0088 -0.0953 0.0111 -0.0057 -0.0204 -0.0148 -0.0061SEL t(t)-2*Vt(t)-2 big
(0.0298) (0.0402) (0.0438) (0.0501) (0.0085) (0.0113) (0.0083) (0.0099)
-0.0468 0.0535 0.0868 -0.0131 0.0086 -0.0063 0.0068 0.0079SEL t(t)-3*Vt(t)-3 big
(0.0474) (0.0404) (0.0533) (0.0281) (0.0096) (0.01) (0.0096) (0.0085)
0.0034 -0.0244 0.0493 -0.0044 -0.001 -0.0073 0.003 0.0008SEL t(t)-4*Vt(t)-4 big
(0.05) (0.0478) (0.0552) (0.0423) (0.0109) (0.0105) (0.0099) (0.0103)
0.0389 0.0349 0.0444 0.0262 -0.0134 -0.0026 -0.0024 -0.0045SEL t(t)-5*Vt(t)-5 big
(0.0553) (0.0599) (0.0578) (0.0431) (0.0096) (0.0091) (0.0088) (0.01)
0.0453 0.002 0.032 0.0224 0.0224* -0.0025 0.0105* -0.004BUYt(t)-1*Dt(t)-1sht
(0.0243) (0.0242) (0.0128) (0.0101) (0.0042) (0.0032) (0.003) (0.002)
0.0405 0.0743* 0.0177 0.0243 0.0141* 0.0045 0.0097* 0.0029BUYt(t)-2*Dt(t)-2 sht
(0.0269) (0.0221) (0.0119) (0.0115) (0.004) (0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0023)
0.0092 0.0027 -0.0016 -0.0099 0.005 0.0049 0.0018 0.0022BUYt(t)-3*Dt(t)-3 sht
(0.026) (0.0235) (0.0137) (0.0114) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0027) (0.0023)
0.0382 0.0486 -0.0117 -0.0124 -0.0027 0.0036 0.0007 0.0044BUYt(t)-4*Dt(t)-4 sht
(0.0254) (0.0236) (0.0118) (0.0113) (0.0044) (0.0036) (0.0026) (0.0024)
-0.0046 0.0307 0.0039 0.0021 0.0014 0.0026 -0.0024 0.001BUYt(t)-5*Dt(t)-5 sht
(0.0225) (0.0227) (0.0121) (0.0109) (0.0036) (0.0045) (0.0027) (0.0023)
-0.0303 -0.1115* -0.0083 -0.0597* -0.0021 -0.0284* 0.0017 -0.0087*SELt(t)-1*Dt(t)-1 sht
(0.026) (0.0272) (0.0112) (0.0142) (0.0031) (0.0055) (0.0021) (0.0023)
-0.0175 -0.0085 -0.0348* -0.0248 -0.001 -0.018* -0.001 -0.0077*SEL t(t)-2*Dt(t)-2 sht
(0.0262) (0.0264) (0.0119) (0.0128) (0.0033) (0.0046) (0.0021) (0.0021)
-0.0324 -0.0432 0.0013 -0.0195 -0.0016 -0.0136* 0.0026 -0.0008SEL t(t)-3*Dt(t)-3 sht
(0.0276) (0.0278) (0.0114) (0.0123) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0023) (0.0022)
0.0193 -0.0221 -0.0253 -0.0175 -0.0014 -0.0057 0.0051 0.0016SEL t(t)-4*Dt(t)-4 sht
(0.0279) (0.0246) (0.0116) (0.0121) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0025) (0.0021)
0.0213 0.0211 -0.0155 -0.0134 -0.0019 -0.0038 -0.0038 -0.0035SEL t(t)-5*Dt(t)-5 sht
(0.0313) (0.0303) (0.0131) (0.0121) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0021)
-0.0224 -0.0301 0.0085 0.0225 -0.0091* -0.0076 -0.0031 -0.0016BUYt(t)-1*Dt(t)-1lng
(0.02) (0.0187) (0.0124) (0.0092) (0.0034) (0.0054) (0.0032) (0.0023)
-0.012 0.0392 0.0128 0.0053 -0.0072 0.0023 -0.0043 -0.0016BUYt(t)-2*Dt(t)-2 lng
(0.0227) (0.0185) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.003) (0.0026)
Decile 2 - GBX Decile 4 - TEC Decile 6 - OC Decile 8 - GAP
Variable Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid Ask Bid
-0.0008 0.0023 -0.0053 -0.0114 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0006BUYt(t)-3*Dt(t)-3 lng
(0.0224) (0.0204) (0.0138) (0.0107) (0.0036) (0.0053) (0.0032) (0.0028)
0.0112 0.0394 -0.0196 -0.0143 -0.0027 0.0041 -0.0006 0.0032BUYt(t)-4*Dt(t)-4 lng
(0.0206) (0.0184) (0.011) (0.0108) (0.0047) (0.0039) (0.003) (0.0028)
0.0048 0.0219 -0.0066 -0.018 0.0095* 0.0065 -0.0043 -0.0004BUYt(t)-5*Dt(t)-5 lng
(0.0196) (0.0188) (0.0117) (0.0102) (0.0037) (0.0046) (0.003) (0.0027)
0.0089 -0.0285 0.0138 -0.0165 -0.0026 0.0077 -0.0089* 0.0011SELt(t)-1*Dt(t)-1 lng
(0.0209) (0.0231) (0.0093) (0.0128) (0.0026) (0.0041) (0.0024) (0.0026)
0.0081 -0.0127 -0.0069 -0.0002 0.002 0.0021 -0.0034 0.0007SEL t(t)-2*Dt(t)-2 lng
(0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0108) (0.0116) (0.0028) (0.0038) (0.0024) (0.0025)
0.0258 0.0106 -0.0105 -0.0172 0.006 -0.0025 0.0001 -0.0017SEL t(t)-3*Dt(t)-3 lng
(0.021) (0.0201) (0.0106) (0.0114) (0.004) (0.0033) (0.0027) (0.0025)
0.0304 0.002 -0.0288* -0.0068 -0.0042 0.0002 0.0035 0.0019SEL t(t)-4*Dt(t)-4 lng
(0.0205) (0.0207) (0.0104) (0.0109) (0.0036) (0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0025)
0.0163 0.037 -0.0005 0.0051 -0.0004 -0.0053 -0.0038 -0.0074*SEL t(t)-5*Dt(t)-5 lng
(0.0278) (0.0273) (0.0125) (0.0103) (0.0033) (0.0048) (0.0031) (0.0025)
-0.114* 0.0061 -0.0821* 0.04* -0.0363* 0.0171* -0.0219* 0.0241*DIURN1
(0.0142) (0.013) (0.0099) (0.0114) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0031)
0.0061 -0.0011 0.0041 -0.0018 0.0012 0.0008 0.0023* -0.0015DIURN2
(0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0029) (0.0038) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.0009) (0.0007)
-0.0009 0.0025 -0.0008 -0.003 0.0008 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0008DIURN3
(0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.001) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0007)
-0.0022 -0.0023 0.0006 0.004 -0.0012 -0.0013 0.0003 0DIURN4
(0.0041) (0.004) (0.0033) (0.0028) (0.001) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0007)
0.0029 -0.0025 -0.0031 -0.0009 0.0002 0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0005DIURN5
(0.0047) (0.0042) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.0007)
-0.0038 0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0022 -0.0008 -0.0004 0 0.0006DIURN6
(0.0053) (0.004) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0007)
0.0059 0.0005 0.0145 0.0068 0.0056 0.0023 0.0006 -0.0026DIURN7
(0.0106) (0.0098) (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0016) (0.0015)
-0.0148 0.0054 -0.0144 -0.0174 -0.0013 -0.0021 -0.0037 0.0078*DIURN8
(0.0122) (0.0119) (0.0081) (0.0085) (0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0019)
